The Argument of 10a1-11b1

ὁ γὰρ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῷ

'..the unexamined life is not worth living..'
- but how do you examine a life?

These remarks quoted below are taken verbatim from the Bristol Classical Press edition of Euthyphro by Chris Emlyn-Jones, where they appear as Appendix 2.

“The argument of Plato’s Socrates in this passage takes the form of what became known (in Aristotelian logic) as an ἐπαγωγή (epagogē): an argument by induction – a ‘leading on’ from particular examples to a general conclusion. The cumulative effect of numerous examples taken from everyday activities leads to the general conclusion, Socrates claims (at 10a5-c4), that, in any given case, an activity is causally prior to the state which results from the activity; just as the state of being carried is a result of the activity of carrying, so that state of being loved is the result of loving. It follows, Socrates claims, that this relationship is not reciprocal, i.e., the activity cannot depend upon the state.  

So, what the gods love is in a state of being loved because it is loved by them; it is not the case that they love it because it is in a state of being loved. But the holy does not behave in the same way; in this case, the state of holiness does not depend on the activity of the gods’ love. So the terms ‘loved by the gods’ and ‘holy’ are not logically parallel and so not interchangeable. ‘Holy’ has to be defined in another way not specified in the dialogue as a whole.

 The argument can be seen schematically as follows:

STATE                                                                                    ACTIVITY
that which is carried ---------------    (because)      → → →        carrying

that which is led        ---------------     (because)      → → →        leading

that which is seen      ---------------   (because)      → → →         seeing

that which is loved     ---------------   (because)      → → →         loving 
HOLY                        ←←←             (because)     ---------------    loving

The argument of Plato’s Socrates at this point has generated a great deal of interest, in two main directions:

(1) Theological. If Socrates’ argument is correct, it has major implications for monotheistic religion. Theologians and philosophers, from Saint Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz to Anthony Flew, have debated the issue of whether it is meaningful to describe something as good simply because it is God’s will (or pleasing to God), or whether it is necessary for an adequate account of a moral judgement to refer to a standard of goodness and badness which is, in logic at least, independent of God’s will. This question has long been known as the Euthyphro problem. For a concise statement of the problem, see Flew, A., A Western Philosophy (London, 1971, ch.1).

(2) Philosophical. The intricacies of the argument have also preoccupied contemporary philosophers. Two chief objections to Socrates’ line of argument are paramount:

     (i) Socrates assumes throughout that the relationship between state and activity is causal. It is however possible to detect an ambiguity in Plato’s use of διότι (10b1, etc), ‘because’. It can indicate a causal relationship, but it may simply indicate that state and activity are merely different aspects of, or ways of describing, the same thing. Indeed, as Guthrie points out (1105n2), the distinction between state ad activity is sometimes quite hard to maintain in Greek, since, for example, φερόμενόν ὲστι (it is in a state of being carried) is often used, in later Plato, indistinguishably from φέρεται (it is carried).It has also been noted that the ἐπαγογή represets a gradual slide from verbs which represet physical activity, e.g. carrying, where the causal connection seems plausible, towards loving, where it seems much less so.

     (ii) We have already noted that Euthyphro’s agreement to Socrates’ suggestion that the holy is loved by all the gods because it is holy, and not for any other reason, is strictly speaking unnecessary; it is not forced by the ἔλεγχος, since it would not contradict previous admissions for Euthyphro to assert that the holy is holy because it is loved by all the gods, i.e., theior love defines it. And of course, this step would seriously damage Socrates’ argument.

     So why does Euthyphro agree to this step? Two answers suggest themselves: firstly, in terms of the dramatric structure of this part of the dialogue, Plato makes the admission plausibly ‘in character’ for Euthyphro; the latter is anxious to invest ‘the holy’ with as much authority as he can and conceding that the gods love the holy because it is holy would superficially seem to be a good move for him. So, being quite unjustifiably self-assured and none too bright, he grabs Socrates’ tempting suggestion in 10d4 withoutr pausing to consider what it implies. Secondly, we need to look at the posiition of this argumet in the dialogue as awhole. It is impossible to know whether Plato was himself aware of the logical weakness revealed at 10d4-5. However the argument does serve to introduce the valuable οὐσία/πάθος distinction in 11a7-8 and the section as awhole effectively concludes the first pre-Interlude part of the dialogue, which is devoted to a criticism of a defintion of ‘holiness’ in terms of prefereces of the gods. After the Interlude, the argument changes direction, concentrating on trying to define holiness as ahuman activity relating to the gods.”

Note on how to read the table:

You might read the table in bold above like this:  Something or someone who is being carried is in that state of being carried because someone is engaged in carrying them. Similarly, someone who is being led is in that state because they are being led. Someone or something which is seen is in that state or condition because someone is looking at them. And hence, someone or something which is loved is in that state or condition because someis loving them. Socrates then claims that it's not like that when you get to thinking about what is holy: someone or something that is holy is not holy because someone loves what is holy but because there is something in that person or object or condition that independent;ly of our activities makes it holy.


Note on Greek words: 

(i)      οὐσία means the being or essential nature of something in contrast here to πάθος which refers to inessential attributes.

(ii)     ἐπαγογή means literally a briging in or on to something, an attack or invasion, but in Logic it means bringing as number of particular examples so as to support a universal conclusion. We usually call this today, the argument from induction.

(iii)    φέρω is the basic form of the verb which means to bear or carry something. It is in fact etymologically the same word as our word ‘bear’, if you go back three or so thousand years.